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JPRS L/10038

8 October 1981

# China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 17/81)



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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

TANK UNITS OVERRUN CAO BANG

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Apr 79 p 1

[Article: "People's Armored Cavalry Carry All Before Them"]

[Text] Editor's note: People have been delighted to see that our young armored soldiers have leveled every dangerous difficulty in the recent defensive counter-attack, carrying all before them in a great display of martial prowess! The China--Vietnam border is hilly and forested, with cliffs, canyons, and narrow passes everywhere. Using tanks in this kind of terrain calls for dauntless heroism and a high degree of proficiency in fighting skills. Our heroic tank soldiers were able to overcome all manner of unimaginable difficulties, cut paths and seized passes, moved ahead boldly, and created marvels in the history of tank warfare, relying on a combination of the spirit of revolutionary heroism and superb fighting technique. Our army's powerful political work constantly nurtures and tempers the heroic spirit of our officers and men to suppress all enemies; our army's military training is strict and arduous, constantly strengthening the tactical skills of the soldiers. It is true that education and training can produce fighting strength.

Our Guangxi border defense forces made a 100-li long-range attack directly on Cao Bang, delivering a killing blow to the Vietnamese forces in that area. What contribution did our young tank units make to the battle? This is not only of interest to all of the officers and men of the army, it is something that concerns the people of the whole country.

The road to Cao Bang is rugged and rough. The terrain of the battle area is perilous, the enemy situation was complex, they were heavily guarded and able to maintain themselves. The key to implementing a combat plan for rapidly surrounding and annihilating the enemy was the speed of dividing and penetrating them, and under these circumstances, the difficult task of taking the lead position falls naturally on the shoulders of the tankers.

Before dawn on 17 February, six red and green signal flares rose high in the air and the ground was shaken by the artillery fire of the counterattack against the Vietnamese invaders. In the flash of the artillery fire, tanks full of power and grandeur roared forward one after another, bearing down on the enemy with the weight of Tai Shan. Tank treads smashed the bamboo stakes that the Vietnamese had set in the ground within our borders, tongues of fire pursuing and destroying those enemy who had been awakened from dreams and fled in confusion. In an instant, the Vietnamese army's painstakingly built first line of defense had been breached.

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Having broken through the pass, our tanks braved a rain of shells and penetrated deeply, swiftly, and violently toward the enemy over perilous karst terrain. Here, beginning with land captured on precipitous cliffs, the road snaked through interlocking dogtooth peaks connecting with one small basin after another like "a long vine growing melons." Every so often there was a narrow pass to cause difficulty for our tankers' swift advance.

In this kind of terrain, tanks have no way to take up battle formations and can only move along in single, serpentine file. If one tank breaks down, those behind it find it very difficult to advance. As the troops penetrated into that pass, the road became more impassable, the width of the space between the two mountains being as narrow as the body of a tank, with rocky cliffs on both sides. There was no time to wait for the engineers to open the way, and no way to detour around it. What to do? First company commander Lin Mengzhu [2651 1125 3796], riding in tank No. 101, inspected the width of the pass, relied on the practical experience of his years of military training, and according to the tank's capabilities decisively ordered driver Zhang Dongfa [1728 2639 3127]: "Blast ahead, and use your horsepower!" Tank No. 101 suddenly went up against the walls of the pass. Once, twice, it collided continuously four or five times, the rock on both sides broke and fell, and the tank finally broke a way through the rock walls and the tanks of the unit followed closely in bursting out of the pass. What courage and resourcefulness! This kind of ramming was not rash, it represented a high degree of coordination between the commanders' heroism and their scientific spirit. It is just this kind of coordination that made this pathfinding tank unit into a sword that will never dull.

When the brigade's tanks got to Na Cuong, they encountered a river. An old dilapidated wooden bridge collapsed before more than a few tanks had crossed it. The commander at once ordered the remaining tanks to ford the stream. Tank No. 406 began towards the middle of the river, some water got into the engine, and the tank suddenly stopped running. Facing this unexpected circumstance, commander Li Wujun [2621 2976 0193] of the 5th Company, following them, decided promptly and opportunely to send in another tank as they might as well make a bridge of the two tanks. Under his direction tank No. 503 was driven into the river and drawn up to No. 406. With the order to move forward, one tank after another rumbled across the river on the auxiliary fuel tanks on the sides of Nos. 406 and 503.

Taking measures like this requires a steadfast determination. When this situation was reported to the unit command post it was universally approved of. Even the most cool-headed and experienced commanders did not withhold their praise: "How daring! Our tank soldiers' comprehension of the battle plan is truly deep, and their implementation is resolute!"

The tanks proceeded, fighting as they went, penetrating 31 kilometers, and arrived at Dong Khe [2639 3305], an important Vietnamese strongpoint, in two hours and 45 minutes, which opened the door for the advance to Cao Bang. The enemy was dreaming and had not imagined that our army could be on their doorstep so amazingly fast, so they began waving at our tanks, thinking we were their own. They did not wake up until we began to fire, but by then it was too late.

Our tank units are not ashamed of being steel men on iron horses. From the time they were dispatched outside our borders to Cao Bang, on the whole endless advance,

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what people along the way saw was our tank soldiers crossing a natural barrier, the bloody battlefield where a stubborn enemy was annihilated, heroic forms.

Near Thong Son, tank No. 507 was hit by an enemy anti-tank rocket and caught fire. There is a deep ditch on the right side at this place and an overhanging cliff on the left, so tank No. 507 was blocking the narrow way completely. At this time, enemy shells were exploding continuously all around our blocked tanks, sending shrapnel and rock fragments whistling by and clattering against the tank turrets. The whole battle situation did not allow them to stay there, and at that instant the terrain and the enemy situation especially did not permit them to tarry long. The tank soldiers knew that tank No. 507 contained several dozen shells that would explode in a few moments. What to do? The wonders that occur in combat are frequently beyond expectations and are more often than not within reason. Commander of the crack 5th Company Deng Ji [6772 4480], who led in tank No. 508, roared forward out of the raging flames engulfing tank No. 507, followed by commander Li Wujun's tank No. 502, three tanks of the 2d Platoon, and two tanks of the 3d Platoon, all of which broke through! When tank No. 507 exploded, seven tanks had already come through safely. This was truly a case of an army dedicated to a just cause having great wisdom and great courage! The speed of advance of this stream of iron was not impeded, and under the accurate fire of our tankers the enemy firing points were reduced to rubble one by one.

The heroic tank units charged through Non kim Son, Na Xuan Son, Qua Cuong, and to a point where Bac Son was right before them. Bac Son is only seven kilometers from Cao Bang, and is a thoroughly important position. The steep slopes on both sides of the highway were studded with pillboxes, bunkers and hidden trenches. Here they had Soviet-made "Hail" anti-tank rockets, American-made anti-tank rifles, recoilless rifles, 40 mm. rocket launchers, and anti-tank mines deployed in a staged arrangement according to their different capabilities, the fire pattern becoming denser toward the rear. From the foot of the hill to its peak there were more than 80 different firing points arranged densely in tiers, and there were even anti-tank personnel hidden in the road culverts. This was the Vietnamese army's strongest ambush ring. The enemy arrogantly threatened: We will demolish the Chinese tanks at this place.

Good will inevitably triumph over evil. You tend to your anti-tank, I'll tend to my anti "anti-tank." The commanders, eager for a fight, determined to raise hell!

When our 6th Company reached the Bac Son bridgehead, they discovered that the 40-meter long bridge had been demolished. Because of the enemy's tight blockade, follow-up units were not able to come up for a time, and the 6th Company had enemy on three sides, a desperate situation. Commander Ren Zhu'en [0117 2691 1869] took over the responsibility for directing the battle from the wounded company commander. The headphones of the tankers carried his resounding, powerful voice: "Comrades, the time for the party's testing of us has arrived! The time has come to win honor for the people! Every tank must pay attention to demarcate fire, and fight with a cool head..." The voice was abruptly cut off as an enemy anti-tank rocket hit tank No. 602, killing comrade Ren Zhu'en.

"Take a blood price from the enemy, avenge the commander!" The commander's unfinished order was immediately translated into combat action on the part of the officers and men. Third platoon leader Zhang Chengzhong [1728 6134 1813] straightened his back and led the whole company in a fierce counterattack against the enemy. The

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arrogant enemy, thinking themselves clever, opened fire from all sides at once, little thinking that in doing this, they were revealing the positions of all of their fire points to our alert tankers. Despite this enemy sabre rattling, the soldiers met the attack calmly, aiming at and annihilating the enemy positions one by one. Along with the roar of the tanks, the enemy's firing points were destroyed one after another, and his position started to become confused. In this way the battle continued from three o'clock in the afternoon until nightfall, when the sounds of firing on the battlefield gradually died out.

To completely destroy the enemy anti-tank positions, the superiors ordered the 6th Company to secure the area and wait for the follow-up units. Under the direction of Zhang Chengzhong, six tanks and the 23 men on them combined with some of the comrades of the fourth infantry company, the first to reach them, to form eight combat teams. They removed four machine guns from the tanks, quickly occupied the advantageous terrain, and organized a ring-shaped defense position. The heroic tankers leaped out of their tanks. Taking up infantry weapons, they again began a new special battle.

Fighting day after day, the soldiers were exhausted, hungry, and cold. But these warriors had only one thought: the men were there, the tanks were there, the position was there, and they would not rest until the stubborn enemy had been destroyed. At two a.m., the enemy stole down from the mountain under cover of darkness. Our soldiers stayed calm and waited for the enemy to get close, then opened fire with all weapons at once, throwing the enemy into a shrieking, howling headlong retreat. Not long afterward, the enemy organized a second attack that was similarly beaten back.

These few iron soldiers, protecting their own tanks, held out for 17 hours within the enemy's much-vaunted anti-tank ambush ring.

At dawn on the next day, tanks of our battalion arrived, accompanied by infantry. The enemy's Bac Son anti-tank positions, already shot up by the 6th Company, needed only little more than an hour to be completely wiped out by a strong coordinated tank-infantry attack. In this battle they fought bravely and tenaciously, as well as resourcefully and agilely, annihilating the defending enemy impassionately and forcefully.

In perilous karst terrain, this heroic tank unit spent more than three days in rapid penetration and gallant battle, moving more than 70 kilometers in length and breadth, right up to Cao Bang. With a dauntless heroic spirit, they penetrated forests, crossed ravines, charged across nine places where the enemy forces had destroyed bridges and roads, carried on 12 relatively large-scale battles with the enemy in five principal areas, destroyed more than 70 enemy bases and positions, victoriously completed the penetration and withdrawal and the mission of surrounding and annihilating the enemy. We have worked hard for 20 years to establish our armored forces and today saw their combat strength.

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YOUNG CADRES GAIN COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Apr 79 p 1

[Article: "Large Group of Outstanding Cadres Mature Rapidly in Battle"]

[Text] A certain unit of the Gwangxi border defense troops has tempered a large group of outstanding young cadres, both brave and resourceful, competent commanders, in the self-defense counterattack. More than 600 men were nominated as cadres and nominated to positions from the firing line. Some old comrades who had been through the Japanese war and the liberation said: "With the talent that has emerged here, we can set our minds at ease!" The masses of soldiers also made it known that we can trust in the fine cadres forged in battle.

The cadres of this unit at battalion level and below and some of the regimental cadres had never been in combat before. In the self-defense counterattack, they learned combat in combat, and modestly studied under those old cadres who had combat experience; they developed military democracy, focused the wisdom of the masses; they conscientiously summarized experience, fighting and advancing alternately, becoming more proficient as they fought, rapidly improving their command skills. Commander Wen Yuzhu [3306 3768 2691] of a certain regiment is a young officer 36 years old. As he was able to study with Deputy Division Commander Li Fu [2621 4395], a veteran of the liberation and the war to assist Korea, and is also able to think things out for himself, he was bold in seeking out experience. Before any battle started, he repeatedly organized battalion and company commanders to look over the terrain, analyze the enemy situation, study specific methods in accordance with the superiors' overall battle plan, and formulated a relatively thorough combat program. After the battle started, he moved the regimental command post as close to the front as possible, went repeatedly to the battalion and company positions to understand their circumstances, calmly and cool-headedly judged the various complex circumstances, and dealt with them quickly and resolutely. In battles to annihilate the enemy at Dong Dang, he extracted great victories at a relatively small price, and was commended by the front line headquarters of the Gwangxi Border Defense. Battalion Commander Xu Yuanran [6079 6678 3544] of the first battalion of a certain regiment joined the army in 1968 and was just promoted from company commander a few months ago. In battle he pays close attention to communications so that his troops can be deployed and drawn back in; he is adept at using his forces in complex terrain, and he always forms a fist; he pays attention to good coordination of infantry and artillery and develops the fighting force of the whole unit. In the battles at Dong Dang and Lang Son, this battalion had the honor to get two banners

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from the division party secretary reading "Fast penetration, swift advance, with the power of a steel sword," and "In the attack on Lang Son, they chewed on two tough bones in succession."

This combat was carried out under conditions of complex terrain and changeable weather, and although it didn't last a long time, they encountered many kinds of unexpected difficulties. The various grades of young cadres in this unit passed this severe test very well. All of the cadres of the first company in a certain regiment are young men in their 20's, some having been in the army two or three years, some having been promoted as cadres for only a few months. In the battle to capture Lang Son, they led their company in cutting off the enemy retreat at an unnamed high point on the west side of the Ky Cung River, prevented reinforcement, and fought fiercely against an enemy that outnumbered them several fold for ten days and nights. Cut off by enemy fire and unable to be resupplied with food or ammunition, the company went without eating for a day or two at a time, whereupon the cadres distributed their own dry rations that they had saved among the enlisted men. In the continual rainy and overcast weather, they were all wet and muddy, but they took the lead in frequent battles to defend their position, were unable to close their eyes for days at a time, and still their will to fight was vigorous. Eight times they attacked out of their position and the cadres always took the lead in the assault. With such a staunch style, the first company cadres lead an unshakable, unbeatable company. The company beat back 21 enemy counterattacks and annihilated more than 270 of the enemy. They always held their position like a nail driven into it. The division party committee has asked the superiors to recognize He Xixiang [0149 6932 4382], a commander of that company, as a "model commander" and to give the first company the name of "Hero company of Qiqiong River." Six comrades were promoted to positions and promoted to be cadres under fire, and all of the cadres established their merit.

In this combat, a large group of young cadres became brave and dauntless pathfinders who dare to fight and dare to risk all. When the troops break through, they put the dagger battalion, the dagger company, the dagger platoon, in the front; when they come across something tough, they take a bite; when they encounter a fire point, they stand up and fight. While organizing rear services personnel to transport ammunition to the front, deputy commander Lu Kuiquan [7120 1145 3123] of the second company in a certain regiment suddenly encountered an enemy fire point. He resolutely directed the comrades to take up a dispersed formation, organized fire cover, and himself quickly stole up on the enemy emplacement. He had with him no explosive devices, but suddenly, in the emergency thought of attaching a detonator to an 82 mm. recoilless rifle shell to make a hand grenade and throw it into the enemy emplacement, killing all six of the enemy. Lu Kuiquan established second degree merit and was given a battlefield promotion to commander. Acting deputy company commander Lu Honggang [0712 3163 4854] of the first company of a certain regiment was once leading a squad and encountered a reinforced platoon of enemy. Lu courageously and coolly ordered his soldiers to take up positions in advantageous terrain quickly, waited for the enemy, surrounded on three sides, to approach to within 30 meters or so, he gave a command, and all their various weapons began to fire at once. On this occasion we suffered not a single casualty and all the enemy were killed except three who escaped.

In a short ten days of fighting, a large group of young cadres also learned how to develop political work under combat conditions, how to handle rear services security

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work, and how to improve the capabilities of administrative units. Political instructor Li Kongqu [2621 1313 5112] of the engineer battalion, leading a company from Friendship Pass to Dong Dang, helped command the company, immediately developed a rally on the spot, cited cases of heroism and model behavior, passed the news of the victory, and encouraged everyone's fighting spirit. He braved the enemy firepower to take the lead in clearing mines. Powerful political work and the model actions of the political cadres encouraged the men of the company to advance, cleared away 13 obstacles, and received the praise of the superiors. Many young organizational and political cadres advanced with the battalions and companies and vigorously developed battlefield establishment of merit and front-line recruitment into the YCL and the Communist Party. There were casualties among the company political cadres, and these men spontaneously took over for them. The mass of young cadres in rear services and on the line have been tempered and tested in battle and have completed their logistical, ammunition transport, and casualty rescue missions relatively well, guaranteeing the combat requirements of the troops.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS APPLY COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN TEACHING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by Cao Yinglong [2580 2019 7893]: "Integrate Our Army's Traditional Combat Methods with Research into Defensive Counterattack Combat Experience"]

[Text] After the shooting started in the defensive counterattack by our border defense troops against the invading Vietnamese, the Nanjing High Level Infantry School began to apply the combat experience summarized between battles on the front in their teaching practice. They did not demand perfection nor seek more, only studied each bit as it came, striving to reduce the distance between teaching and actual combat and to accelerate the pace of training commanders.

In teaching and studying the tactics of the previous phase, some students expressed the feeling that there is not much use in studying now the combat methods of the past. Some teachers also felt that much of the teaching material, teaching cases, battles, etc., were written up on the basis of our army's past combat experience and they felt unsure that they were appropriate to modern combat, so they taught without conviction. As the combat experiences of the defensive counterattack continued to be transmitted to them, they immediately summarized them further and the leaders of the school and the party branch quickly introduced it to the whole student body and faculty. Each teaching and research section developed a mass study and research movement. Just as the second unit was conducting teaching in regimental attack, they compared the tactics being studied in the classroom with the experience coming from the front lines, and from this they saw clearly that with regard to tactical thinking and tactical methods, all the traditional combat methods, like deep penetration and return, separate and surround, close combat, night fighting, and small groups taking many routes, were all effective in the defensive counterattack combat. In organization and command, being composed and resolute, resourceful and quick, with all echelons of command getting as close to the front as possible, closely organizing coordinated actions between the various branches are all bits of traditional experience that are still appropriate for use today. In combat actions, full utilization of terrain features, contacting the enemy from under cover, coordination of fire and movement, alternating cover, alternating advance, head-on suppression, flank attacks, etc. can still be employed today. As for combat style, heroism and tenaciousness, quickness and resourcefulness, not fearing sacrifice, fighting continuously, etc., still developed a great deal of power in the defensive counterattack. Through comparisons, the students were made to recognize that we need only study the laws and characteristics of

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modern warfare and apply our army's traditional combat methods cleverly to be able to defeat the enemy. This raised the students' interest in study of tactical subjects, and they were all even more conscientious and meticulous, whether studying theory or operations on the sand table.

In the defensive counterattack, the officers and men of our heroic border defense not only fully developed the power of our army's traditional combat methods, they also studied many new tactical methods on the basis of their opponents' combat characteristics. This new experience, for which they exchanged blood and life, is the precious wealth of our army and provides new content for teaching in the schools and academies. The leadership of this school and each teaching and research section have already assimilated this new experience into their teaching. In making up teaching plans, they increased research classes on the Vietnamese army and prepared their classes in ten short days and continuously enriched the teaching materials and teaching cases with relevant data from the front. In arranging the curriculum, they increased classes in mountain and jungle combat. The armored teaching section developed a second period course in knowledge of service arms, and when they were writing notes for the combined force commander on the employment of tanks, they particularly increased two items: one was that in complex terrain where it is difficult to move and under circumstances of poor visibility, tanks must not become separated from the infantry, but infantry must lead the tanks forward; second was that to prevent their employment beyond their capabilities, it is intended that students will get more training on tanks during their observation and familiarization. In his teaching, tactics instructor Zhang Qunbo drew on new experience from the counterattack and enriched the educational portion of combat implementation with lessons on alternate fighting and mopping up, earthworks construction, political offensives, etc. At present, many teachers are collecting material and researching problems for the next step in using the combat experience of the border defense troops to lay down a foundation for command education.

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VIETNAM BORDER WAR PROVIDED EXPERIENCES IN MODERN WARFARE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by staff commentator: "Transform the Experience of the War of the Self-Defensive Counterattack Into Wealth for the Whole Army"]

[Text] The first spring after the focus of the party's work was shifted, our Guangxi and Yunnan border defense units, in order to defend the peace and tranquility of the motherland's border and the motherland's construction of socialist modernization, was forced to carry out the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam. In this war, they won a major victory both militarily and politically.

This war of self-defensive counterattack occurred at the end of the 1970's. With regard to its time period, it was a modern war, and looking at it from the aspects of weapons and equipment, defense works and facilities, the participation by all arms of the service, as well as combat command, communications and transportation, and logistics support of both the enemy and us, it also contained certain features of war under modern conditions. In this sense, it was a form of modern warfare. Even if the war had a definite limited nature, it cannot be denied that it provided a very good basis for our exploration of the rules guiding warfare under modern conditions. It can be said that this war was one of the tests in military science that are hard to come by; we traded our blood for experience which could not be bought with money. Speaking of this war and looking at its outcome, everyone showed much concern for soldiers killed, wounded, or captured and the vehicles, horses, and cannon captured on the battlefield. This is quite natural. But we still should see that through this war the units that participated in it were tempered in an overall manner and were tested in a rigorous manner, and obtained rich experience. This is an outcome of the war which has far-reaching significance. Conscientiously summing up the experiences of this war of self-defensive counterattack and using them to guide in all aspects of building the entire army will be a powerful motivating force for further implementing all the policies and tasks set by the 1975 enlarged meeting of the Military Commission, the 1977 meeting of the Military Commission, and the 1978 all-army political work conference. The effect and power of these experiences are very hard to calculate but they are extremely valuable.

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By saying that they are valuable, first of all we mean that we were tested encompassing all aspects in actual war. For the armed forces, peacetime training is very important, but actual warfare is the most authoritative training. Every item of work that is done by units in peacetime is done for the purpose of ensuring that they will be victorious in battle. We could see clearly, when the guns sounded, in our units' establishment and organizational system, weapons and equipment, strategy and tactics, education and training, political work, logistical support, management systems, border defense construction, national defense projects, etc. In relation to the adaptability to the demands of modern warfare, those things that must be adhered to, those that are useful and those that are not, those that must be improved, and those that must be developed. For many problems which had not been grasped or about which there were different views, a common language was relatively easy to find on the battlefield. With regard to combat-preparedness training, in peacetime, one can, of course, shoot at targets and drill, and be tested and examined on tactics and techniques, but the most rigorous test conditions are not as rigorous as the real guns and bullets on the battlefield, are not as rigorous as the life-and-death struggle between armed men on two sides; the most true-to-life conditions of training exercises can only approximate but cannot be a substitute for actual warfare. It is just as the fighters say: "In peacetime training, you can hit targets at will, and the targets cannot hit you." There is a great difference between having been on the battlefield and not having been there. Precisely because of this, the experience gained on the battlefield is particularly valuable for us.

Its value lies in the fact that we obtained direct experiences of modern warfare. With regard to anything, including those things found in war, if one wants real knowledge and real insight, one must experience it firsthand. Are we not studying modern warfare every day? It is like looking at a person in a fog. That is, we have only a blurred picture, and there are many unknowns. Now, having fought this war, our ideas have been straightened out. At any rate, to the realm of our understanding has been added the new concept of the "special warfare of special warfare," breaking through a certain rigidity and set patterns in understanding modern warfare. It is like not being able to swim unless one goes into the water; if one doesn't go to the battlefield one will not learn how to "swim" in war. In this war, many of our old heroes and cadres of the war period obtained new experience, and the great number of fighters and the overwhelming majority of middle- and lower-level commanders--all of whom were taking part in battle for the first time--were tempered in the fire of battle, learned through practice what combat was all about, and learned the skills of actual warfare, thereby training a large group of excellent leading cadres and a backbone of combat contingents. The actual warfare experiences that they had will surely have a long-term effect on the building of our army.

Its value also lies in the fact that we found, in the spirit of seeking truth from facts, some basis for studying the laws of warfare under modern conditions. All wars conducted at specific times, places, and conditions have their own special ways of manifesting themselves and their own laws. This war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam really had many new features in comparison with the Middle East wars and some other wars. By looking at the summation of the experiences of these features, we can enrich the treasure house of military science and deepen our understanding of modern warfare. Our understanding of warfare

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under modern conditions, like the understanding of anything, always proceeds from the special to the ordinary, from the particular to the general. To study conscientiously and fully understand the features of this war is of important significance for our understanding and grasp of the universal guiding laws of modern warfare. The general resides in the particular. The things learned by the people during the brief 17-day war of counterattack are extremely important. From the practice of the big and little hegemonists, we can and should find certain tactics for dealing with the big hegemonist. The strategy and tactics of "killing a chicken with a cattle knife," the close combination of courage and skill, the close coordination of all service arms, the vigorous political work during warfare, the timely, uninterrupted logistical support, the people's war combining soldiers and civilians, etc--all these things are fully effective for guiding training and combat in the future. What is precious must be recognized, cherished and used. If we neglect to sum up our experiences because we consider that the war has been completed, then this victory will not be complete; only by summing up these experiences can the victory be called complete. This is like a farmer's grain crop that must be harvested when it matures; now is the harvest season and it is precisely the time when we must conscientiously sum up these experiences. A bumper crop requires a bumper harvest, and grain must be put in storehouses. By truly summing up and spreading these experiences in good fashion, we can transform them into the common wealth of the whole army. The summation of experiences must be systematic, comprehensive, and complete. Both the "watermelons" and the "sesame seeds" must be selected, and we certainly cannot lightly cast aside the props provided by things exchanged for blood. The experiences of each and every service arm under all sorts of conditions must be summed up. The question of cadres' organizational command should be the focal point for the summing up of experiences. The experiences to be summed up in horizontal sections are military affairs, politics, and logistics; the experiences to be summed up in vertical sections are tactics, techniques, and work style. Big experiences must be summed up and so must medium-sized and small experiences. The armed forces' system of organization, the policy for building up the armed forces, and how we conduct training must be the first series of questions to be considered. The experience of a specific battle and a model example of battle, including the experiences of the tactics and techniques of individual soldiers, must all be summed up from the level of the squad, platoon, company, battalion, and regiment all the way up to the level of the division. The large number of successful experiences must be summed up, and the lessons of certain setbacks must also be conscientiously summed up. Our own experiences must be taken seriously, and we must also study the strong points of the enemy in order to draw lessons from them. If, in doing things according to these demands, we depend only on a small number of experts and scholars, we will do them poorly. We must fully mobilize the masses, get everybody to use their brains, get each and every person to talk and hold lively discussions where everybody comments on these matters, and thereby bring about an atmosphere of democracy and of study. The units with practical experience from the war have the most right to speak; the units who did not take part in the war can use the great amount of written materials about it to make comparisons with their own practice in training and in combat-preparedness work, discuss these things well, and formulate plans to improve education and training. In this way, a campaign of widespread military democracy will be launched



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throughout the army, and all aspects of the experiences will be summed up and a complete set of teaching materials will be formed.

In summing up the experiences, we will be trying to formulate laws. This requires that we take as our guide Mao Zedong's military thought, apply the viewpoints of dialectical materialism, develop perceptual understanding of the war into theoretical understanding, raise the large amount of fragmentary and unsystematic practical materials to the level of military science, and from these experiences extract things that will serve as laws for directing war. Two things are important in truly seeking these laws: The first is that we must have the spirit of storming fortifications that is displayed on the battlefield. We must immerse ourselves in investigation and study, possess a wide range of materials, set our minds to working arduously and thinking diligently. When the fighting was good, in what respect was it good and why was it good? When the fighting was not good, what lessons can we learn from it? We must carefully make concrete analyses and strive to make a leap in cognition. The other thing is to maintain a down-to-earth attitude and to uphold the principle of seeking truth from facts. One is one, two is two, right is right, wrong is wrong. On the basis of trying to make the facts clear and correct, by carrying out the processing work of eliminating the false and retaining the true, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, proceeding from this to that and from the exterior to the interior, there must be a great effort to make the experiences we have summed up scientific and of high quality.

Of utmost importance in summing up experiences well is to be concerned about the total situation and to operate from a strategically advantageous position. There can be numerous specific experiences in war, but all of these experiences are subject to a greater problem that controls and restricts them, viz, the relationship between war and politics. If this problem is not clarified, the so-called experiences will lack ideological content. "War is the continuation of politics," "war is the continuation of politics by other means," "politics is bloodless war, and war is blood-shedding politics"--this is the theoretical basis for our approach to the meaning of all wars and is the fundamental starting point for our investigations of every kind of war. The war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam obviously cannot be an exception. Only from this political approach of opposing the global strategy of Soviet hegemonism and scientifically analyzing all kinds of contradictions, can we understand and grasp more profoundly, through the war's essence, the goal and meaning of this war of self-defensive counterattack and can we weigh more correctly all kinds of experiences from this war. Some comrades possibly will say that these big questions are matters for the leadership organizations and high-level cadres to consider, and that they themselves are only concerned with concrete experiences. Not so. If one doesn't have the whole in mind, how can one deal with the parts? With regard to the question of taking seriously the study of the laws of the total situation in war, Comrade Mao Zedong, in the third section of the first chapter of his famous work, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," made a brilliant dialectical exposition. He pointed out: "Why should a campaign or battle commander have some understanding of the laws of strategy? Because a comprehension of the whole makes it easier for one to handle the part and because the part belongs to the whole." When summing up experiences, we would remind the comrades that it is profitable to look at military

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operations from the perspective of political struggle and to grasp the total war situation when analyzing concrete experiences.

For the whole army to profit from the part that took part in the war is a general demand. The most important thing in meeting this demand is to establish the proletarian view of war and to strengthen the sense of urgency with regard to using the experiences of the war in rapidly building our army into a modernized revolutionary armed force. To realize the "four modernizations" is a heroic undertaking and not a short-term matter. During this long process, we cannot expect that the international environment will always be calm and tranquil, and we also cannot expect that there will be no hostilities on our border caused by the international environment. One main reason the "four modernizations" are imperative is to free ourselves from the situation of being passive and vulnerable to attack. And we are also rapidly constructing the "four modernizations" in an environment of international class struggle. Therefore, to defend by arms the construction of the "four modernizations" should become a completely unequivocal idea of our comrades through the army. Through this way of thinking and looking at problems, the awareness of using war experiences in modernizing our army will be greatly strengthened. Based on the defense of construction of the "four modernizations" by armed struggle, we must apply the experiences of this war in studying how to improve our military establishment and organizational system. Some things must be readjusted, some things must be replenished, and for even more things we must do good work in reducing the "swelling." If we are always content to have too many people doing things, and the superstructure is still gigantic, topheavy, overstaffed, and low in efficiency, then a great amount of precious time will be wasted in taking turns in drawing charts and in making official trips. How can modernization be rapidly realized? And also how can the demands of war under modern conditions be met?

Based on armed struggle to defend the construction of the "four modernizations," we must uphold the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, closely integrate theory and practice, and vigorously pursue ideological and political work in our army. In this war, our equipment and technology were certainly not superior, but the spirit of patriotism and revolutionary heroism displayed by the units that took part in the war was meritorious. The source of this spirit lies precisely in vigorous, revolutionary political work, in a high degree of political awareness on the part of the revolutionary fighters. By conscientiously learning from and applying the experiences to political work in this war; by upholding the fundamental principles of political work, by making full use of the glorious traditions of political work, and by paying particular attention to new situations and new problems, timely and creatively applying these revolutionary principles and fine traditions to new historical conditions, we will fully develop the power of political work. This is something that will be effective in both peacetime and wartime, and will be a major factor in permanently improving combat effectiveness.

Based on armed struggle to defend the construction of the "four modernizations," we should improve our army's weapons and equipment. In this war, the fact that we were able to inflict a large number of casualties on the enemy's effective strength, destroy his modernized defense works, and insure timely and uninterrupted supply, besides being related to the high degree of political

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awareness on the part of our units, was directly related to the continual upgrading of our army's weapons and equipment over the past several years. At the same time we must see that if it were not for the previous years of disruption and destruction caused by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," our army's weapons and equipment could have been somewhat more modernized, and we can admit that a bigger victory in this war could have been bought for a smaller price. Just think about the modernization of our army's weapons and equipment in this way: If they are not modernized it will not do; if they are not modernized rapidly it will not do, if they are not modernized we will be subjected to bullying, and if they are modernized slowly we will be vulnerable to attack. Obviously we must pay attention to the fact that hand grenades and satchel charges played a not inconsiderable role in this war. However, it would be incorrect in any case to depend on these things to win victories and to lose the sense of urgency about improving weapons and equipment. We should become proficient in the weapons at hand and rely on existing equipment to win victories; we should also by every means quicken the pace of modernizing our weapons and equipment. We must have the atom bomb while not casting aside the hand grenade; this is quite in accord with materialist dialectics.

Based on armed struggle to defend the construction of the "four modernizations," we must put education and training in a strategic position and speedily draw them along on the right track. Actual war is the best yardstick for testing training. How can training meet the demands of modern warfare? What are the good guiding thoughts, contents, focal points, and methods of training? By studying the experiences of this war, we should find the correct answers. If only we do a good job of combining the experiences of this war with the reality of every unit's combat mission and training, proceed from our army's existing equipment and the reality of modern warfare, and truly reform training, a new situation will emerge and a qualitative leap will take place in our army's education and training.

War is a great school. The experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack are rich and precious teaching materials we have learned in this school in various aspects including military, political, and logistical. If only we are willing to study, are adept at study, and draw nourishment from these experiences, transforming them into our flesh and blood, they will become a powerful motive force that gives impetus to all our work, and will strike root and blossom with radiant splendor in the construction of our army's modernization!

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EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM BORDER WAR SUMMED UP

Compilation of Battle Examples

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by staff correspondent Zheng Jian [6774 0256] and staff reporter Cao Jinhua [2580 6930 5478]: "Organizing a Special Force To Conscientiously Compile Battle Examples"]

[Text] A certain regiment of the Yunnan border defense units, during the war of self-defensive counterattack, took part in 21 fairly large battles in the 4 areas of Mengkang, Dongjia, Weima, and Longkeping in which it obtained many combat experiences. In order to sum up well these experiences, the regiment's party committee decided to form a battle-example compilation group composed of several comrades led by a deputy regimental commander. By the end of March, the group had compiled six important battle examples.

The compilation group, by laying stress on investigation and study and by upholding the principle of seeking truth from facts, made the battle examples reflect battle conditions accurately and authentically. First of all, they repeatedly studied and made selections from the battles that the regiment had engaged in, and decided to compile examples of battles that possessed different features. Next they went down to the basic level and held informal discussions with the cadres and fighters there, and through careful investigation of the enemy's situation and the terrain of every battle, and on the basis of mastering a great amount of firsthand material, wrote preliminary drafts. Then they again met with the cadres and fighters in the companies and made repeated verifications and revisions.

When the compilation group was compiling the battle examples, they also conscientiously studied Chairman Mao's 10 great military principles and his relevant military writings, and used Mao Zedong's military thinking and tactical principles to guide the summation of experiences. The 1st battalion of this regiment, in its attack on Mengkang, in the complex terrain of high mountains, deep valleys, steep slopes, and dense woods, at one stroke annihilated over 200 enemy soldiers. Training section chief Chang Yeja [7022 0673 1367] and staff officer Hong Zhengquan [3163 2973 0356], when compiling these battle examples, stressed the application of Chairman Mao's tactical thought concerning fighting battles of annihilation with regard to five experiences in mountainous jungle regions.

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At present, this regiment has already examined and finalized the drafts of the six battle examples it compiled, has mimeographed and distributed them to the companies, and has organized the cadres and soldiers to study them for guidance in the unit's training.

Public Commendation Stressed

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by staff reporter Xing Shicao [6717 4258 2347] and staff correspondent Zhang Guangtong [1728 1639 2717]: "Upholding the Principle of Giving Priority to Public Commendation and Giving Full Play to Positive Factors"]

[Text] In its appraisals of combat performance, a certain regiment of the Guangxi border defense units, by giving priority to public commendation and by looking at the positive factors of every person and every thing, has made the combat appraisals and the summing up of battle experiences truly play the role of enhancing morale and strengthening unity.

Owing to his lack of command experience, a company political instructor of this regiment, when leading his unit to storm and capture an unnamed hill south of Lang Son, conducted the battle less than adequately. In its combat appraisal, the leading comrades of the battalion and regiment affirmed and commended his courageous fighting spirit. At the same time, they helped him to sum up the lessons of his experiences in command, without attaching any blame to him, which completely convinced the political instructor of his shortcomings.

The leading comrades in their combat appraisals put much stress on encouraging the new soldiers who had not received systematic training. A new soldier, who had joined the army this year, was slow to advance in a battle because he did not utilize the surface features of terrain. In their comments and appraisals, some fighters blamed him for this. After discovering that he was being blamed, the leaders actively guided everybody to a correct evaluation of the new fighter. The company political instructor along with everyone else made a concrete analysis of every phase of the new fighter's behavior, from marching at night to plunging into battle, so that everybody had an all-round view of him. During the combat appraisals, the merits of this new soldier were publicly commended, thereby arousing his enthusiasm.

The policy of this regiment in upholding the priority of giving public commendation in guiding the combat appraisals and the summing up of war experiences has obtained fairly good results. Now, the officers and men of the regiment, on the basis of announcing commendations and achievements, are using the war experiences that have been summed up to guide training, thereby bringing about a vigorous upsurge in mass military training.

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HEROIC BATTLE TO TAKE CAM DUONG DESCRIBED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by staff special correspondent Fan Kuangfu [3058 0562 1133] and staff reporter Sun Zhibo [1327 1807 2672]: "Sweeping Away a Rotten Evil--the Fall of Cam Duong"]

[Text] On 25 February, our Yunnan border defense units at one stroke captured Cam Duong, a place of strategic importance in northwestern Vietnam.

Amid the sound of scattered rifle and cannon fire, as the smoke of gunpowder was being slowly dispersed, reporters accompanied the troops as they advanced toward Cam Duong. All the way, they saw, scattered in disorder on the ground, only the dead bodies of enemy soldiers, guns, ammunition, and backpacks; the defense works on both sides of the hilltop had collapsed, and the artillery positions and the guided-missile positions had become ruins; and on the outskirts of and inside the city of Cam Duong were over 200 overturned and askew vehicles.... Yes: the Vietnamese soldiers suffered a crushing defeat and threw away everything in a headlong flight for their lives.

A few days before, one main ringleader of the Vietnamese authorities sternly ordered the Vietnamese Army to "defend Cam Duong to the death" and resolutely to protect this strategic place, well-known for its abundance of apatite. They assumed the posture of fighting a "decisive battle" against us, boasting: "If the Chinese Army wants to capture Cam Duong, it will need at least a year." But, in the twinkling of an eye, strategic Cam Duong was captured.

Why did this happen? Was it because their military force was weak? No. Stationed in Cam Duong were units of the 345th Division of the Vietnamese Regular Army and also the special service forces, the youth assault forces, etc. To the southwest, prepared at any time to come to the city's support, was the "elite" 316th-A Division. This military force could not be said to be small.

Was it because their firepower was not strong? No. On every hill and at every important road, they had deployed weapons of all kinds, which might be called an integration of short- and far-range weapons, an arrangement in pairs of light and heavy weapons, indirectly and directly aimed weapons which supported each other.

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Was it because their defense works were not sturdy? Again, no. As early as several years ago, they had painstakingly built many defense works of steel-reinforced cement on several of the main hilltops, linked by tunnels and communications trenches that crisscrossed and formed a network as tightly knit as a spider's web.

In that case, what in the final analysis, was the reason that the Vietnamese Army collapsed so suddenly and suffered such a disastrous defeat? The reason is simple: Facing them was an army as powerful as a thunderbolt, fighting for a just cause, troops armed with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, heroic troops long tested in the fire of battle--a rolling torrent of steel that could not be blocked!

Early in the morning on 23 February, our border defense units commenced a tremendous artillery barrage, which sounded like mountains collapsing and the earth cracking. The enemy positions were instantly transformed into a sea of fire and thick smoke hid the sky. Under cover of this powerful artillery fire, our infantry split into four columns and, like a fierce tiger coming down from a mountain, attacked the hills on the periphery of Cam Duong. The 3d Company of the "Steel Battalion" of a certain unit, like a sharp knife, thrust straight into the enemy's lair. When the company commander was wounded, political commissar Yang Xiuqing [2799 4423 3237] took command and shouted: "Comrades, make a resolute charge for the motherland and for victory!" The warriors made a fierce attack and swiftly occupied the enemy's first and second lines of trenches. Just then, two concealed firing points raked them frenziedly and the unit's charge was checked. Fighter He Junlin [0149 6511 2651] jumped out of the trenches, rushed forward and blew up one of the enemy's concealed firing points. Just as he was about to blow up the second concealed firing point he was wounded in the chest. His comrades-in-arms wanted him to go back, but he remained in front and would not turn back, resolutely climbing forward. When he was 4 or 5 meters from an enemy bunker, he pulled out a hand grenade and threw it accurately into the bunker entrance. After a tremendous roar, the enemy machinegun fell silent and six of the enemy were dead or wounded. He Junlin had given up his young life for the motherland. His comrades, following the path made by the blood the martyr had shed, charged up the main peak.

Our fighters attack boldly, vigorously, and tenaciously, and they are resourceful and flexible. After the 4th company of a certain unit had captured two hills in succession, at 1500 on the same day it came to the foot of Hill 369. When it was preparing to outflank the hill from the right, it was blocked by enemy fire. The cunning enemy also lighted a fire on the hill that, fanned by the prevailing winds, burned with a crackle toward the company. At this grave juncture, Li Qi [2621 0796], a new fighter who had been wounded in his left leg, rushed into the sea of fire and drew off the enemy's fire. Seizing this opportunity, the assault platoon swiftly outflanked the hill on the right and quietly closed in on the enemy entrenched on the main peak. Zhang Dehai [1728 1795 3189], resourceful leader of the 6th squad, crawled straight over to the front of the enemy battalion's command post without being discovered by the enemy. A fellow wearing the insignia of a senior captain was gesticulating there. Zhang Dehai fired off a cartridge clip and followed this up by throwing several hand grenades, sending

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the battalion commander and three others to the Western Paradise. On the other side, platoon leader Li Shicheng [2621 0099 2052] and 5th squad deputy leader Li Shuming [2621 2611 2494] groped their way to the enemy's machinegun defense works on top of the hill and suddenly leaped up and fired fierce bursts. The enemy threw down their guns and fled. Discovering that their battalion commander had been killed and that their defense works on the peak were occupied by us, the enemy at once scattered in all four directions and fled for their lives. We took this opportunity to destroy each and every one of the enemy soldiers, and a reinforced company and a battalion command post were thus wiped out.

On other hills, the attacks mounted by our border defense units were also extremely fierce. The enemy hurriedly reported the emergency to his superiors and asked that he be reinforced posthaste by the 316th-A Division. But the 316th-A Division was still being blocked by the warriors of the 2d and 6th companies of a certain unit and was like a mad dog shut up in an iron cage running about in an effort to break out and bumping against the bars. The division launched 18 assaults in succession, and all were repulsed, so it could only haul away the dead bodies in carts and flee in panic. The "elite" division could not stave off the crushing defeat of the enemy defending Cam Duong.

During the battle to capture Cam Duong, where did the great intelligence and courage of the officers and men of our border units come from? During the days they were gathering material for their story, the reporters felt strongly that the spiritual term "motherland" gave the border defense fighters inexhaustible strength. The solemn slogan "Win glory for the motherland" encouraged the officers and men to charge and take the enemy positions, energetically and bravely to kill the enemies, and impelled the torrent of steel to surge forward with irresistible force.

Xu Xianguo [1776 7341 0948], a new fighter of the 3d Squad, 3d Company, Red Army Regiment of a certain unit, is a lad who came from the hometown of Qiushaoyun. After arriving in his unit, he took part in denouncing the Vietnamese authorities for their frenzied crimes against China, heard the political instructor relate the glorious traditions of the 3d Company, and understood that the fighters shouldered the responsibility of defending the motherland. Not long afterward, he received a letter from home, which urged him, like the heroes of the volunteer army [during the Korean War], to defend the motherland and charge forward. Reading the letter warmed Xu Xianguo's heart and added strength to every fiber of his being. On 23 February, the company to which Xu Xianguo was assigned attacked Hill 191, northeast of Cam Duong. After the assault began, owing to the deep grass and thick woods, he lost contact with his comrades in the squad. Without the slightest fear, he fought bravely alone, and seized the opportunity to fiercely return the enemy's fire. Singlehandedly he held fast to his position and did not let the enemy attack break through. Afterward, Xu Xianguo, again on his own initiative, joined the battle ranks of the 2d platoon and, together with his comrades, attacked the hill. For his meritorious service to the motherland he was honored by being admitted into the party.

"Win glory for the motherland by going forward to the last man and charging to the last breath!" This was the pledge taken by Wu Yong [0702 0516], deputy leader of the 5th Squad, 9th Company, of a certain unit. On a day before the assault on Cam



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Duong, Wu Yong wrote on his backpack the words "Win glory for the motherland, charge as long as one has a breath in one's body." Filled with this kind of determination, he flung himself into the battle to attack Hill 280 on the north side of Cam Duong. At noon on that day, Wu Yong saw that 18 enemy soldiers were desperately trying to seize an unnamed hill west of Hill 280, so he boldly charged toward them. Unfortunately, a bullet struck him in the abdomen. Wu Yong, clutching his lower abdomen with his left hand and with his right hand holding his weapon hanging from the gunsling on his right shoulder, continued to charge. When he had advanced about 50 meters, another bullet hit him in the left arm. Wu Yong, with the strength of steel, still did not fall. Lifting his left hand, which had been pressing down on his stomach, he calmly selected favorable terrain, assumed a kneeling posture, and, holding his submachinegun steadily in his hands, sprayed the enemy with fierce fire. Before long, an enemy bullet ripped through his chest.... The political instructor and fighters of the 9th company, at a briefing given to reporters afterward, said: After the battle, we shouted Wu Yong's name and ran forward, only to see Wu Yong leaning on a bank of earth still maintaining his posture of firing in a kneeling position, his open eyes looking at the unnamed hill in front, and sprawled before him were four enemy corpses.

Our fighters, with this kind of incomparable love for the motherland and inveterate hatred for the enemy, and with the heroic spirit of prevailing over all enemies, relentlessly punished the Vietnam aggressors.

By 1800 on 24 February, we had captured all the enemy hills on the periphery of Cam Duong, and our border defense units, with irresistible force, pressed straight on to take Cam Duong. The remnant enemy forces fled in disorder to the Wai Bo [phonetic] River south of Cam Duong. Every one of our columns of deep-thrust units, at rapid marching speed, thrust powerfully toward the Wai Bo [phonetic] River to pursue and destroy the fleeing enemy. By 25 February, we had captured all of Cam Duong. After our border defense units entered and garrisoned Cam Duong, they immediately began to comb the hills and mop up the enemy. As if they were hunting rats, they dug out the defeated and dispersed enemy soldiers from their hiding places. We annihilated over 2,000 enemy soldiers. This signaled the end of the battle of Cam Duong, which was a victory for our army and a crushing defeat for the Vietnamese Army.

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CAPTURE OF MOUNTAIN PEAK DURING VIETNAM WAR DESCRIBED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by special staff correspondent Zhang Zhengyang [1728 2973 7122]: "Mass Heroism and Daring--Pressing Forward With Indomitable Spirit"]

[Text] The 9th company of a certain unit, a company which during the battle of Lang Son took by strategy the highest peak of the Me Bien Mountains and cut off the enemy's line of retreat, was awarded by the superiors with a silk banner inscribed "Heroic Company of the Me Bien Mountains."

At 1200 on 3 March, the 9th company, after a rapid march, came to the banks of the Ky Cung River and by clever means crossed the river. Before dawn on the next day, the 9th company began an assault on the main peak of the Me Bien Mountains. The 2d platoon, which was charged with the mission of conducting the main attack, advanced to an unnamed hill. When platoon leader Chai Chaohe [5591 0877 3109] discovered that the enemy had set up artillery on the opposite hilltop, he immediately ordered the 82-mm mortar squad attached to the platoon to open fire. Striving to be the first to get at the enemy, the gunners blew up all the enemy's artillery pieces. Taking advantage of these circumstances, the fighters charged forward and the company rapidly approached the main peak.

Then the 9th company, directed by company commander Yu Lijin [0205 0632 6855], adopting the tactic of a multipronged attack, fiercely assaulted the main peak. Luo Chunsheng [5012 2504 3932], leader of the 6th squad, rushed to the extreme front and killed four of the enemy in succession. The enemy, seeing the ferocity of the 2d platoon's assault, thought we wanted to storm and occupy the main peak from this direction and moved its main force to counter the 2d platoon. Then the 7th and 8th squads of the 3d platoon, seizing this opportunity, stormed up the peak. The outcome of our attack was that the enemy was wiped out, leaving 56 dead bodies on the peak. The 9th company, at an extremely small cost, had victoriously occupied the main peak of the Me Bien Mountains, thereby insuring that our army could use its main force to assault the enemy defending the fortified city of Lang Son.

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TEST PILOT RECOVERS FROM INJURIES, FLIES AGAIN

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by Li Ciying [2621 2945 5235]: "'Lei Feng-Type Pilot' Wang Guanyang Ascends Into the Blue Heavens Again"]

[Text] Air Force "Lei Feng-type pilot" Wang Guanyang [3769 0385 2254] has recovered his health and is again flying into the blue heavens.

On 19 June 1977, when carrying out a scientific research test flight mission, Wang Guanyang was flying at the high altitude of 8,000 meters, when the engine of his aircraft suddenly stopped. Unable to restart the engine, in order to protect the scientific research equipment on the plane and the safety of people's life and property, Wang firmly abandoned his chance to parachute to safety, and, steering his aircraft so as to avoid on three occasions, factories, schools, villages, and crowds, made a successful forced landing outside the airfield though he was seriously injured. An examination revealed that his first lumbar vertebra sustained a multiple fracture from being compressed, his lower vertebrae were cracked, and his lower limbs seemed to be paralyzed.

The party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua showed extreme solicitude for Wang Guanyang's injuries. On Wang's 2d day in the hospital, Vice Premier Wang Zhen, who was inspecting work in that locality, rushed to the hospital and expressed his sympathy and solicitude for Wang on behalf of Chairman Hua and Vice Chairman Ye; he commended Wang Guanyang as a "heroic model pilot" and presented a bouquet of flowers to him. The Air Force Party Committee bestowed on Wang the honorary title of "Lei Feng-type Pilot," and selected him to be a delegate to the Fifth NPC and a delegate to the national scientific conference.

In order to help Wang to make an early recovery, the hospital set up an emergency treatment team composed of its leading cadres, professors of medicine, and nurses. After repeated studies, the team decided on the ideal treatment program, which would not only cure Wang but also allow him to fly again. The team decided not to operate but to use a traction method which would effect a reduction of the vertebrae. But this method would require the patient to endure a considerable amount of pain. Wang said with determination: "If only you can cure me so that I can fly again, I will stand any amount of pain." During the treatment process, Wang carried on a tenacious struggle against his pain. In October 1977, he left

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the hospital. He persevered in such activities as running, swimming, playing ping-pong, and scaling hanging ladders, and never discontinued them during the frigid winter days or blazing hot summer days. Because of this regimen, his body rapidly recovered its health. At the beginning of this year, after an examination conducted by the Air Force General Hospital he was pronounced fit and was permitted to fly.

One day in the first part of March, the sun shone brightly. Wang Guanyang and instructor Hua Jun [3323 0193] took the controls of an aircraft and flew into the sky, where they put the aircraft through a series of movements such as circles, dives, climbs, and rolls. When the aircraft landed, his comrades came forward to greet him, warmly shook his hand, congratulated him, and urged him to obtain even greater successes in his scientific research flights.

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TRAINING REFORM STRESSES SIMPLICITY, PRACTICALITY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by Tan Ji'an [6223 0679 1344] and Liu Shitong [0491 0013 6639]: "Employing Existing Equipment to Improve Training Has Bright Prospects"]

[Text] There is one view which holds: "Infantry elements don't have much bayonet training and there is not much training involved in throwing hand grenades," and "With our present equipment, it is useless to reform training." Recently, the Jinan garrison organized a demonstration by 21 elements advanced in training reform, and it was a powerful answer to this do-nothing attitude.

The units taking part in this demonstration were units from the Jinan garrison that had emerged in the past few years as showing the first successes in training reform. This demonstration centered around the "three attacks" and "three defenses," namely, having technical training as well as tactical training, having training of combat elements and also having training of rear services and security elements, and having nighttime as well as daytime training. Some units demonstrated the skill of fighting speed with speed in dealing with enemy motorization. Some demonstrated "tricky moves" for attacking enemy tanks. Each of these demonstrating units had its own strong points, and the weapons in the soldiers' hands each had their own wonderful effects, causing the spectators to open their eyes wide, and to open their minds as well.

Strengthen Research on Adversaries in Future Wars, and Make the Research "Meticulous"

Many of the demonstrating units came to know that strengthening research on the enemy situation is a prerequisite to reform of training. This has two effects: One is that it is conducive to breaking out of our mental rut. The more deeply we carry out our research on the enemy situation, the stronger will be the compulsion to reform training. The second is that the more meticulously we do our research on the enemy situation, the better directed our training reform will be. Therefore, research on the enemy situation can not be done by and large, but must be "meticulous." We must put in the time and energy to study it all, from the enemy equipment to their strategic and tactical thinking, from combat principles to combat methods, from the attacks, amphibious landings, and airborne drops of the initial stages of a war to enemy combat characteristics in all the stages of development, from enemy movements in large unit operations to the combat movements of individual elements, even the movements of single soldiers. Practice has shown that those units carrying out their research on the enemy situation well will be relatively

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accomplished in reforming training. The first company of a certain regiment, having ordinarily taken research into the enemy situation very seriously, determined, in a skirmish with enemy force advance units during the demonstration, that their enemy commonly opened up a way with tanks and moved in motorized vehicles. So in seizing the advantageous terrain, they did not, as in the past, race to control the high point, but seized the hilltop, the slope, and the foot alike ahead of the enemy, launched their movement ahead of the enemy, and opened fire ahead of the enemy. They deployed their forces in depth and in echelons. They said that in this way they could prevent the enemy from skirting the commanding position and continuing forward. If they had taken the high point as in the past, they would have been doing exactly what the enemy wanted. Further, in surrounding and annihilating the enemy, they took note of the enemy's armor characteristics and struck first at the enemy tanks and armored vehicles, then at enemy troop concentrations, and finally at the dispersed enemy, utilizing advantageous terrain, surrounding the enemy, carrying forward the fine traditions of close combat and night combat, and, all-in-all, fighting a beautiful "skirmish."

In Technical Activities, Convert "Slow Work" to "Fast Work," and Learn the Knack of Fighting Speed with Speed

Motorization and high speed will be major characteristics of future wars. Speaking in a certain sense, speed is victory. In the past, some comrades always felt that any future war would come suddenly, enemy units would be motorized, and it would be difficult for infantry elements to fight speed with speed. The experience of some of the elements in this demonstration showed that to deal with the suddenness of war and changes in the style of combat we must on the one hand depend on improvements in our military equipment, and on the other hand depend on our strict training to accomplish it. Under present circumstances of our having poor equipment, if we reform all those complicated operational regulations, reform those cumbersome accessories that may or may not be needed, and reform all those routine methods of operation, we can greatly strengthen the mobility of combat infantry. The 82 mm. mortar that has accompanied infantry elements in the past is not itself a heavy weapon, but the accessories like the mortar base and mortar frame are heavy. In previous training, not one step was left out, from aiming to firing. The 82 mm. mortar squad of a certain mobile artillery battery taking part in the demonstration often thought about the suddenness and speed of future warfare while in training. Since last year, they have reformed the conventional training methods of past years. The equipment was changed from heavy to light, the firing procedure was simplified, the number of members participating was reduced, actions were speeded up, they practiced hard at range finding and aiming, simplified firing, and after a year of effort, the whole squad had acquired a body of special skills. No matter what the terrain, a mortar barrel can be carried on the back and fired when you stop. In a year they carried out 13 firing exercises with live ammunition, fired 164 rounds, and scored 160 hits. On the day of the demonstration they were seen to operate a single mortar barrel, changing the firing direction frequently and changing their position frequently, using it smoothly, and the shells, as if they had eyes, hit the target every time. In past infantry element training in the 82 mm. recoilless rifle, many units were overcautious in selecting a base and setting up their weapon. Since last year, the officers and men of many 82 mm. recoilless rifle elements were concerned because these weapons were used principally against enemy tanks and armored vehicles, and tanks are fast and attack with ferocity, so we are not allowed to move at a leisurely pace and must reform. The 82 mm. recoilless

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rifle squad of the second battery of a certain unit participating in this demonstration changed the former overelaborate positional attack to a shoulder firing method that stresses training. While moving the soldiers carry the weapon on their shoulders, and when the situation arises they squat and fire, unrestricted by positional considerations, greatly reducing both preparation time and preparation procedures for firing. Comrades watching the demonstration said that the accessories and operating procedures for various kinds of weapons all have a certain scientific rationale and all have a certain use, but in accordance with the demands of modern warfare and without violating scientific laws, it is extremely necessary to learn several more "fast" skills, and it is something we should advocate vigorously.

Consider the Most Complex and Most Difficult Areas and Popularize Soldiers with Multiple Skills and More Training for Warfare

A certain "tiger attack company" participating in this demonstration, in past firing training, thought a great deal about results and thought little about actual combat, and often conducted their training in relatively good weather and terrain. In the reform of training, they trained more in how to adapt to complex circumstances and made this an important part of their training reform. To temper their combat capabilities under circumstances where the enemy is using nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons, they spontaneously changed their firing training to conditions of having to wear gas masks. At first, being physically unaccustomed to it, their results were not good, but they did not think about results and kept on with this kind of training. Although there was wind and snow at the demonstration and the circumstances were complex, they obtained the second most outstanding results for live ammunition firing even wearing gas masks. There were some companies participating in this demonstration that also reformed the problem of too fine a division of labor in some of the former specialty training and stressed allowing the soldiers to learn several combat skills. After comrades in an artillery squad learn to be gunners, they can also be aimers, ammunition handlers, and loaders. When comrades on an infantry squad learn how to handle a rifle, they can also use an assault rifle and machine gun, and some master enough scientific and technical knowledge to be able to study the use of any advanced weapons that may be captured from the enemy.

In Combat Training, Pay Attention to Carrying on Traditional Combat Methods and Studying New Combat Methods Boldly

Some of the elements taking part in this demonstration pay attention in their combat training to leading the officers and men to carry on our army's traditional combat methods and boldly study new combat methods, according to the composition, equipment, and tactical thinking of the enemy. The seventh squad, fifth company, of a certain unit, in training on squad attack, kept in mind the enemy's defensive characteristics and studied three questions: one was with regard to an adversary in a future war, pay close attention to the characteristics of their fire dispersal and study how to penetrate the enemy's front-line defense "fire control zone" quickly and covertly; second, with an eye to enemies using a broad defense front, great depth, and many obstacles, study ways of opening up and passing over roads through it; third, with an eye to enemy defense that emphasizes the development of the use of tanks, study methods of using small groups over multiple routes in a coordinated attack on the tanks. In this demonstration the comrades watching were very inspired. The eleventh squad of the garrison company of a certain regiment,

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in their individual defense, with a view to the fact that enemy combat thinking ordinarily involves infantry moving forward behind tanks in an attack, separately rehearsed a set of methods for striking at the enemy tanks and at the enemy infantry. In the demonstration, soldiers were seen meeting the enemy tanks, drawing near rapidly, placing an explosive device, leaving and taking cover immediately, opening fire on the enemy infantry, and moving with precision and dexterity. Comrades watching the demonstration said, our training of soldiers ought to be like the way they have been trained, actively exploring ways of striking with an eye to the enemy characteristics, this is truly vivid training.

In addition, these demonstrating elements also carried on active reforms of teaching methods. For example, full development of democracy, inspiring the cadres and men to think about and discuss combat methods; in training, development of small group training, organizing revolutionary competition, carrying out criticism of both teachers and students, giving even greater development to our party's and our army's mass line in the training of soldiers.

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CSO: 4005/2098

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

POLITICAL EDUCATION COURSE ON AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Jun 79 p 1

[Article by Ma Ronggui [7456 2837 2710], An Dewei [1344 1795 0251] and Dong Xiangqi [5516 4382 6386]: "Help Fighters Get Rid of Their 'Hang-ups'--a Report on a Political Education Session by the Political Instructor Liu"]

[Text] Recently, several fighters from the Seventh Company of Unit 81268 received letters from home reflecting certain conditions concerning the implementation of economic policies in rural areas. The subject attracted the attention and discussions of the comrades. On that day, fighter Zhang Yirong [1728 5030 2837] from Hunan showed his letter from home to the political instructor, Liu Wenzheng, saying, "Tell me--from mutual aid teams to cooperatives to people's communes, the road has always been one of collective prosperity, but now they come out with a "contracting to the team" idea--is this conducive to carrying out agricultural modernization?" Several fighters present joined in and started a lively discussion with everyone eager to put in a word. Some asked, "This was dealt with during the cultural revolution, so why bring it up again?" The fighters had hoped that the political instructor could explain it to them, but Political Instructor Liu could not off-hand explain it too clearly--he could only give them a few words of advice which obviously did not satisfy anyone.

Seeing that the fighters' mental hang-ups were not dispelled, Political Instructor Liu felt disturbed. But he felt that he was in a difficult position. Since his superiors had not arranged any education program concerning policies, could he say anything on the subject? It would be easy indeed for him to use a few big empty words to stifle the fighters' questions. But would that rid the fighters of their ideological hang-ups? As a political cadre during the transition of the focus of party work, he should be receptive to the discovery of new situations, to the study of new problems and incessantly try to dispell ideological obstacles blocking the progress of the cadres and fighters--this was his duty. What especially disturbed him was the vague understanding demonstrated by the fighters there which showed that their thinking still had not broken free from the ultraleftist line of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four." If the fighters were not lent a positive guiding hand, how could they catch up with the new situation where the party is switching work emphasis. At this point in his thoughts, Liu became imbued with courage and strength and was determined to help the fighters shatter the mental shackles that were placed on their heads by Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four". Furthermore, he would help them correctly understand the present policies so that they could march forward with confidence.

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An understanding of the correctness of the present policies would be the best argument for persuasion. Political Instructor Liu earnestly studied Central policy regulations concerning agricultural villages and familiarized himself with each of the fighters' hometown situations in seven provinces. He went, furthermore, to locally stationed commune production brigades to make investigations. One of the fighters' father was a secretary of a Party branch in an agricultural village. Through this fighter, Liu came to understand the current situation concerning economic policies. Then after comprehensive analysis, he began to educate the fighters. First, he lectured on the good trend shown by implementation of Party economic policies in rural areas. He explained from all aspects that "contracting to the team" was a method to strengthen the production responsibility system, to mobilize the labor enthusiasm of the vast number of farmers and to develop agricultural productivity. In direct response to the suspicion that "contracting to the team" was a step back, he pointed out, "Whether or not it is a step back depends on whether it is beneficial to the consolidation and development of the socialist collective economy. During the Cultural Revolution, under the ultraleftist influences of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four", the "contracting to the team" form of production organization was incorrectly criticized. Now we are working from reality to apply methods that were effective before the Cultural Revolution--this is liberated thinking. "Contracting to the team" is a positive policy for the development of production and not step back at all." At the same time he explained that a few individual areas carried out "division of land to families"--this was a deviation a few units committed during the implementation of policies and was not a problem of the Central policies themselves. The fighters must believe that local party organizations and the masses would eventually correct this tendency.

This lecture completely won over the fighters. That night, many fighters wrote home educating their families on a correct understanding and on a determined implementation of the Party's current agricultural policies. The fighters expressed that they would devote themselves to the work of the army and guard the four modernizations with real actions.

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CSO: 4005/2086

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CONCEPTS 'MODERN' WARFARE, 'MODERNIZED' WARFARE DISTINGUISHED

Beijing JIANFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 21 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by Jin Yan [2529 3508] and Ye Xing [0673 2502]: "A Dialogue On Modern Warfare and Modernized Warfare"]

[Text] Recently we overheard an interesting conversation between two staff officer comrades concerning modern warfare and modernized warfare and have organized and recorded it as follows:

Staff Officer Zhang: Old Li, there were many opinions concerning our latest defensive counterattack at the combat evaluation meeting yesterday. Some said it was modernized warfare, others said it cannot be considered modernized but only modern warfare. What is your understanding of the two concepts, modern and modernized warfare?

Staff Officer Li: My understanding is that modern and modernized warfare are two different concepts. Modern warfare refers to the time during which the war occurred. Modernized warfare (also called warfare under modern conditions) refers to the application of the most advanced modern scientific technology in battle, complete with modernized military equipment, modernized combat commanding and modernized combat methods.

Staff Officer Zhang: I agree with this point of view. I feel, however, that the two are different yet also related. The concept of modern warfare is broader, encompassing a wider range. It can include modernized warfare with its advanced military equipment, but it can also include various specialized warfare where relatively backward military equipment is used. For instance, the war to help Korea resist the U.S. and the Middle Eastern War would be modernized warfare. African guerrilla wars and the Cambodian war against Vietnamese invasion would, however, be modern wars but not modernized wars. Often we say that "training must be tailored to the needs of modern warfare"--that is using the concepts "modern warfare" and "modernized warfare" interchangeably.

Staff Officer Li: Right. After clarifying these two concepts, we can understand clearer what we should call the latest defensive counterattack. This retaliation is a war which occurred at the end of the seventies. From the point of time, it is modern warfare. Due to the scope of the war, the limitation of battle site conditions and other factors, both sides used only conventional weaponry. It could have been a three-dimensional war, but it did not become a reality. Hence, it is not a typical

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modernized war. Naturally, this is not to say at all that it is totally unrelated to modernized warfare. During this war, the military equipment, the defense works and the coordination of the various types of arms all revealed in differing degrees certain characteristics of modernized warfare. From this definition, this self-defense retaliation war is a special war within a special war that possessed characteristics of modernized warfare. It probed into the characteristics and laws of modernized warfare, provided research material and contributed a definite basis for study.

Staff Officer Zhang: I furthermore feel that clarifying the two concepts of modern warfare and modernized warfare and making clear what this last counterattack was is all about is a great plus in guiding us in making a summary of our warfare experience and in applying the experience in future training and warfare--it can prevent blindness and can raise our political consciousness. In the first place, we will not equate this war with modernized warfare and will not make all warfare experience absolute. Having fought and bled in battle, and therefore highly valuing the summation of war experience is undoubtedly correct, but if we do not seek truth from facts and merely regard the part as the whole, using the specific to arrive at the universal prematurely and taking modernized warfare to be only this kind, then it would simplify modernized warfare. As a result, we would consciously lower the standards of our education training and battle preparation work unconsciously. We would not earnestly pay attention to special points and developments and to study warfare laws under modern conditions. If we do this, we will definitely sustain great defeats in future wars.

Staff Officer Li: Let me add to that. Clarifying these two concepts can also prevent us from another one-sided error--that is, we should accept and recognize the special characteristics of modernized warfare which this war possessed and treasure the valuable experience which was bought with blood. In the summation and application of the experience of this war, we should consciously apply scientific methods to use the parts see the whole, the specific to see the general, to see peace time in war time, and to extract ways to deal with big hegemonist powers from our experience with fighting the little ones. On the other hand, if we belittle the special characteristics of modernized warfare which this war possessed and overlook the necessity of summarizing and studying war experience, what would that lead to? The result can only be: after one experience, we will not have gained an ounce of wisdom; after one war, we will not have progressed one step; education and training would still stay the same and when war comes around again, we may even take a more tortuous road.

Staff Officer Zhang: Our points of view are comparatively similar. Of course, that doesn't mean that our points of view are necessarily correct. Let's bring our viewpoints up and discuss them with the others.

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CSO: 4005/2086

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ARTICLE DISCUSSES TRAINING TO MEET DEMANDS OF MODERN WARFARE

Flame Throwing Training

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by Yu Qiguang [0827 1142 0342] from the headquarters of the Antichemical Warfare Corps: "From the Use of Flamethrower Soldiers to a Combined Training of Specialized Soldiers"]

[Text] A flamethrower is a close contact weapon, used by the infantry in attacking the enemy's sturdy firing points, blockhouses, tunnels, trenches, caves, shelters and in destroying the enemy within buildings. This weapon gave play to a special combat power during the self-defense retaliation war against Vietnam and compensated for the insufficiencies of rifles, artillery and tanks during close contact fighting. For instance, when a unit of border patrol in Yunnan was assaulting enemy fortifications in Man Chau and Lao Cai, rifle and artillery fires were helpless against the enemy's zigzagging defense works and the tanks were unsuited to move in to destroy them. The commander then mobilized a platoon of flamethrowers to participate and aid in the combat by carrying out close contact flamethrowing at the enemy's defense works. Thirty-eight of the enemy's combat targets were wiped out and the fighting was ended quickly. In any type of fighting, if the commander has a relatively deep understanding of the principle of using flamethrower soldiers and can utilize them in a relatively suitable manner, the flamethrower troops would be able to demonstrate great effectiveness.

And yet, under the same fighting conditions, the flamethrower units under some of the troops are unable to give play to their powers and may even sustain greater casualties. The major reason is that commanders of some platoons, companies, battalions and even regiments lack general knowledge about the flamethrower as a weapon and do not know how to utilize this specialized troop. Unnecessary casualties would result especially if the commander does not know to organize firing to neutralize, interdict and contain enemy fire and is not able to give cover to the flamethrower unit while it is in the act of flamethrowing.

The use of flamethrowers is not supposed to be complicated, so why should there be such occurrences contrary to our general knowledge. There are three major reasons. First, it is because we "never burn incense during peacetime and only clasp Buddah's feet during wartime." The flamethrower unit is usually assembled on the spot to work with the infantry. Normally, the flamethrower soldiers are not even trained with

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with the foot soldiers, so the two groups do not understand one another and are unable to coordinate. Secondly, in training and leadership, some commanders of combined arms forces have only one type of arms in mind--they value the infantry and overlook special troops and specialized units and do not want to take specialized soldiers like the flamethrowers. Only during combat do they recall that there are such specialized soldiers to be used. Some combined arms forces commanders lack even the most basic knowledge about such specialized troops. Third, the training of the specialized troops is in itself not up to standards. Many cadres and soldiers of specialized units reflect that "specialized soldiers are noncombatant public works soldiers." They are indispensable for construction work, road repairs and production work. It is not even sure that they can complete their own technical training, let alone learn about the infantry. How can we change this situation? The lesson that we learned from this self-defense retaliation war gave us the following enlightenments:

1. Specialized soldiers are not dispensible to modern warfare, but they can have a very important role. In our present equipment organization system, specialized arms occupy a high ratio, and from the developmental trend of modern warfare, special troops and specialized troops will have an increasingly greater ratio. But specialized soldiers have always been neglected. Take the instance of the flamethrower troops. Since their establishment in the fifties, they first distinguished themselves in action during the Jiangshan Island war and then again during the Indo-China border defense retaliation war and were considered to be the second most effective weapon for the destruction of enemy fire points. But in the years of peace afterwards, people began to forget about these specialized soliders, and after many cuts in the equipment organization system, these specialized troops became only a seedling, occupying an extremely secondary and subordinate position. Scientific study of this type of weaponry was almost terminated. Yet, it was these undervalued and pitifully few flamethrowers which once again demonstrated their combat prowess in this last defense retaliation. All commanders who took part in the war cried out for a reinstatement and an increase in the organization and equipment of flamethrowers and a strengthening of the building of the troops. The facts showed that specialized soldiers are an important source of power in the coordinated combat of all types of soldiers. In the cases of foreign military, specialized soldiers are not being undermined but are being increasingly strengthened. At the same time that the United States and the Soviet Union are racing to develop nuclear weaponry, they are continuing the building and training of the various specialized troops. The Soviet Army in its combined arms forces not only includes light flamethrowers but also heavy flamethrowers, and is busily carrying on training with the flamethrowers fighting in cooperation. The American Army in its combined arms forces not only has flamethrowing and smoke emitting specialized troops with battalions and companies equipped with oil bombs, each infantry platoon also carries flamethrowers. In the British, French, German, Japanese and other East-West European troops, there is similar flamethrower organizational equipment and great emphasis is placed on the building and training of this specialized unit. The answer as to whether we should increase or slacken the building of specialized troops such as flamethrowers is evident without further explanation.

2. The commander of combined arms forces must change his habit of depending on only the infantry and quickly change his attitude to emphasize a good grasp of all different kinds of special and specialized units. The lesson taught by this defense retaliation tells us that giving play to the organic power of all the various types of arms is the key to gaining battlefield victory and that the inexperience of commanders of combined arms forces with special troops and specialized troops and

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their inability to utilize them suitably are the basic reasons for the poor coordination of the various types of soldiers. Therefore, from now on, we must especially stress that commanders of combined arms forces grasp the importance of training special troops and specialized units and that they familiarize themselves with these types of soldiers and learn how to utilize them.

3 Normal practice must be like real combat--specialized units like the flamethrowers must be coordinated with infantry companies for combined drilling. The self-defense retaliation also tells us that last minute cooperation cannot form the soldiers into a fist; only strengthened training during peacetime can bring about coordination during wartime. Hence, after completion of its own technical training, the specialized unit should be sent to infantry battalions or troops for coordinated combat training. Flamethrowers and foot soldiers must be trained together on all battle formations with actual weapons, artillery and flamethrowers. This way, it would, on the one hand, familiarize the comrades of the infantry unit with the use of flamethrowers and enable them to learn how to give flamethrower soldiers cover to enable the latter to complete their task. And on the other hand, it would enable the flamethrowers to learn infantry knowledge so that they would understand the combat aims of the infantry and better coordinate with them to complete the mission.

## Infantry, Artillery Coordination

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by Li Songlin [2621 2646 2651], Huang Wenzhou [7806 2429 5297] and Cang Yongxiang [5547 3057 4382] from an artillery platoon of the Jinan Forces: "Contents and Methods on Improving Artillery Training Encircling Infantry-Artillery Coordination"]

[Text] Ground artillery is used by the army as a surprise fire attack force during combat. The army is responsible for using artillery to interdict enemy fire, destroy enemy fortifications and support the infantry in its fighting. Whether the infantry can fight together in coordination with the artillery will have direct influence on the outcome of the battle. But for how many years now have artillery and infantry under the same division never met. The training of artillerymen is basically a technical training of a single type of arms; ordinarily training consists of a single vehicle, a single artillery piece, a single man. Firing practice at the end of the year is according to the training assignment which is to shoot a few firing exercises at a fixed shooting range. Coordinated training is mostly limited to one's own coordination of sighting, and clearing and maneuvering the artillery piece. Once, when we were drilling in coordination with the infantry during practice with live ammunition, a great number of problems arose. A commander of combined arms forces was not familiar with the artillery unit and firing was based on guessing. The commander of the artillery unit did not understand the infantry's combat goals and laws of mobility, so that even after the infantry had occupied the "enemy's" forward position, the artillery firing arrangement was still not completed so the unit was, therefore, unable to give the infantry support fire at the right time. Nor did the infantry understand the military function of the artillery and it was unable to take advantage of artillery attack and fire power to penetrate deep into enemy lines. At the end of the practice drill, both commanders said with deep feelings: "Had there been a real war, this type of last minute coordination would indeed result in great losses." How can we change the situation where infantry and artillery never meet for practice. After the self-defense retaliation war against Vietnam, we gave a great deal of thought to this problem and feel that we should do the following:

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We feel that a key factor would be to have organizations above the division rank create conditions for the artillery to practice together with the infantry. The artillery unit under regimental command belong to the same organizational regimental system as the infantry, so the coordinated practice of these two is relatively easier to carry out. But the artillery regiment under divisional command is fundamentally unrelated to the infantry part except during large-scale practice when all are assembled together. This situation cannot be resolved by the artillery regiment itself. We hope that divisional leaders and organizations can plan many medium- and small-scale combined drills during the year. By medium-scale we mean using the division as the unit to organize artillery regiments to take turns to have combined practice with the infantry under divisional command. By small-scale we mean that there must be artillery participation in infantry battalion practice. In order to heighten the effect of combined practice, we suggest that officers of the combined arms forces carry out artillery practice with live ammunition. This would enable the officers and cadres above infantry battalion rank to familiarize themselves with the organization, equipment and military function of the artillery and with live ammunition practice enable them to understand the principle of the use of artillery and better apply it and enable them to give the artillery reasonable assignments. The artillery can, on the other hand, learn the various coordination techniques during combined practice.

We must center on the coordination of artillery and infantry and strengthen the artillery's tactical training. At present, the artillery units are basically doing technical training. Tactical training is minimal, so that when they do have combined practice with the infantry, the two cannot cooperate and are unable to bring about a consistent coordination. Therefore, artillery tactical training time should be increased, centering closely on infantry-artillery coordination problems; cadres and soldiers should be organized together to study the infantry regiment's organization, equipment, weaponry functions and tactical characteristics. The artillerymen should, furthermore on their own accord, review and study infantry practice, with emphasis on understanding the duties of the infantry during all kinds of combat and the movements of the infantry during the various stages of combat. They should study the many battle formations (such as attack, defense, ambush, contact battle) and learn how to aid the infantry with artillery support during the various stages of combat. The tactical arrangements of companies, battalions and other groups during live ammunition practice must be completed before the conclusion of the practice. Rigorous demands must be made on the troops based on artillery-infantry coordinated combat standards and the main aim of artillery planning, deployment and movement must be placed on supporting the infantry to achieve victory.

We must center on artillery-infantry coordinated training and improve the technical training of the artillery units. The speed, accuracy and the ability to give surprise attack form the basis of support for combat infantry. In the past, because there was not much consideration given to coordination, the elements of speed and surprise attack were often neglected. In the future, technical training should be firmly set up with service to the infantry as the guiding thought, centering on quick preparation, quick and accurate shooting and surprise shooting. Reform and readjustment in technical training content should be implemented, and at the same time, based on the experience of this self-defense attack, new training topics should be added in order to meet the need of artillery-infantry coordination, such as intermittent neutralization shooting (sudden stopping and shooting to create illusion and impede enemy action) and the feint removal of artillery and feint stoppage of fire in order to coordinate with the infantry's feint attacks and surprise flank attacks and other such war tactics. We must especially strengthen the training of the artillery's forward observation posts so firing can achieve suddenness, accuracy and fierceness.



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Commanders, Troop Coordination

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by Zhou Nan [6650 0589] and Wei Youlong [7614 1429 7893] from a troop of the Beijing Forces "Commanders Must Have a Broader Range of Knowledge"]

[Text] It is said that "Commanding lies not in bravery but in resourcefulness." The coordination of the various arms in combat, to a commander, especially a high level one, lies in his versatility in the art of war. If a commander is to master the art of war, he must have a broad range of knowledge. The most basic requirements is that he be familiar with the various types of arms and with the principles of how to use these arms correctly. On the complex and ever changing battlefield, in order to be able to judge the hour and size up the situation so as to be able to correctly command his own various troops as well as to manoeuvre the enemy's commanding talents, the commander is required to understand and master many fields of knowledge. Lessons from foreign and domestic wars from antiquity to now and the knowledge of how to make use of weather and geography are all very important to the commander. Clausewitz in his book, "On War," said that "Military talent is the harmonious union of various spiritual powers." This is very true. Especially under conditions of modern warfare, modern sciences such as high energy physics, space technology and computer science are continuously being applied to military affairs. The range of knowledge that a military commander is exposed to becomes increasingly broader. Therefore, increasing the sphere of knowledge of commanders is an important step in the cultivation and elevation of the cadres' organizational and commanding abilities.

At present, the majority of our military commanders have never gone through institutional schooling and their cultural level is relatively low too. During job training, the cadres were limited to organizational and commanding duties on their own level; hence, their range of knowledge is relatively narrow. We feel that all levels of commanders, especially those in higher ranks, should increase their range of studies, centering on the topic of elevating modern warfare organizational and commanding abilities. They should learn, on their own, foreign and domestic theories of military science, step by step and in a planned way. For example, they can center their studies on foreign military thoughts, strategies and tactics of World War II: They can read the memoirs of Eisenhower, Zhukov, Roosevelt and Churchill, the "War Documents" of Rommel, and "The General Staff Headquarters of the War Periods" of Shtemenko. They can analyze what the changes in political and military situations during the Great War brought about in terms of strategic and tactical problems and problems of combat methods, how these problems were handled, why they were so handled and extract useful lessons from them. Reading Sokolovkii's thoughts on the problems of modern military strategy and Grechko's thoughts on future warfare would be very helpful in the study of Soviet revisionism. The commanders must study astronomy, geography, history and space technology. Only broad knowledge can lead to great resourcefulness. After the commanders have been enriched by a broad range of knowledge, they will then be able to correctly make use of the art of war during combat, based on knowledge of the enemy's situation, their own situation, on the weather and on geography. But to truly accomplish this will indeed be difficult.

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Army, Air Force Coordination

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by Li Yongan [2621 3057 1344] and Jin Zhifu [6855 1807 4395] from the Air Force of the Jinan Forces: "The Army and the Air Force Should Carry Out Confrontation Drills"]

[Text] For a long time, the army and the air force have carried out training independent of one another. When the army trains against planes and defending against air raids, the situation and the targets were always make believe; and because the air force training is not in conjunction with the army, coordination, reconnaissance, diving, bombing and attacking are done from the air into "empty air." Even during large-scale exercises organized in military areas with the air force part of the fighting, it is still only a display type of joint exercise. For instance, during joint exercises when airborne units of the air force are to bomb certain key ground targets, they just fly to a designated battle area, dive and go through the motions of bombing. As to how to carefully choose air routes, how to avoid ground fire, or how to adopt sudden attack methods to bomb targets, there is little study or training. Likewise with the army. During anti-bombing joint exercises, the battle position is not even camouflaged--when the planes arrive, the artillerymen take aim, make a few gestures and that completes the joint exercise. This type of joint exercise cannot bring about good training results. But even such demonstrations of joint exercises are rare.

The army and the air force should have more joint exercises. They must drill on fighting with one another as the enemy. This way, with coordinated exercises, the air force can meet with participating army units to study how to discover targets, how to approach under cover without detection, and how to make surprise attacks. The army, on the other hand, can study how to disperse, take cover and organize anti-aircraft surveillance and firing while there are actually planes in the air. At the same time, they can discover one another's problems which come up during training and make corrections in time. Both sides would be able to avoid wasting a great deal of man power and material resources in setting up fake targets. This would be less troublesome and more economical as well as realistic. Such training would indeed have a great advantage. As a matter of fact, all the military areas possess the facilities for such training--the problem is one of lack of organization. If all the large military areas have a supervisory organization for coordinating exercises and often call for the meeting of the leaders of the army and the air force to study problems of joint exercises and organically combine the contents of army training with the subjects of air force training, it would make it possible to promote the improvement of the training quality of both sides and enable them to understand one another so that a foundation can be laid for wartime ground-air cooperation.

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## MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

## BRIEFS

ARTILLERY WARTIME EXPERIENCES--The leading comrades of a certain artillery regiment of the border defense units have personally taken charge of leading the summation of experiences in the war of self-defensive counterattack. Deputy regimental commander Li Dianhua [2621 3013 5478], during the course of taking charge of a positional command, was well organized, decisive in command, and corrected mistakes when he discovered them in a timely manner, thereby satisfactorily completing his task of command. He summed up his experiences in "getting a good grasp on the four links in order to insure that cannon fire is accurate." Deputy regimental leader Wang Junhai [3769 0971 3189], for leading an observation team to a forward position, where it reconnoitered the enemy situation and accurately directed our artillery bombardment of targets, was awarded the Merit Citation, Second Class. He then summed up the knowledge gained from his experience in setting up a frontline artillery observation post for mountain warfare. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1] 9727

VALUE OF MULTIPLE SKILLS--A certain unit of the border defense units, in summing up its experiences, has integrated battle and training, viewed training from the angle of actual warfare, and further clarified the direction of training reform. In the battle of Bo Shan [phonetic], the second gunner of a type 708 battle vehicle of the 7th company was wounded by a bullet. The chief gunner hurriedly came forward and bound up the wound. The driver of the vehicle immediately took the place of the chief gunner in firing the cannon. The vehicle continued to engage in the battle and wiped out the enemy firing points. From this battle the cadres and fighters further saw the usefulness of being expert in one thing and good at many things, and resolved to learn several combat skills in future training. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1]

LESSONS FROM BORDER WAR--In summing up its experiences, a certain artillery regiment of the border defense units employed the viewpoint of "one divides into two" in looking at its successful experiences without evading its weak links. For example, because the distinguishing marks of some companies were not clear enough, they failed to timely annihilate the fleeing enemy; because some fighters fired artillery shells that were not equipped with fuses, the shells failed to explode, etc. Through the summation, the cadres and fighters, from the lessons of their personal experiences, saw the importance of strict training and strict demands. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1] 9727

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